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Abstract: 
In this paper, I examine two competing interpretations of Hegel’s “master-slave dialectic” 
from his classic text, The Phenomenology of Spirit. These interpretations, offered by Frantz Fanon 
and Ato Sekyi-Out respectively, disagree on what they see as the central feature of the process of 
obtaining mutual recognition, as Hegel understands and presents it in The Phenomenology. While 
Fanon upholds the importance of the violent nature of the struggle “to the death,” Sekyi-Otu 
criticizes this endorsement of violence and aims to highlight instead the features of reciprocity and 
mutuality. I argue that Fanon’s focus on the violent nature of the struggle can withstand this 
criticism, seeing it as essential that oppressed groups play a role in obtaining their own recognition 
from those occupying dominant positions in oppressive systems. Considering this claim in 
contemporary social contexts allows us to shed light on current resistance efforts, and how true 
independence and the possibility of recognition for marginalized groups often requires the 
willingness to “risk one’s life” or “struggle to the death” for recognition. As such, I endorse Fanon’s 
reading of Hegel’s dialectic and consider how it can be applied to contemporary social movements.  
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 “He who is reluctant to recognize me is against me. In a fierce struggle, I 
am willing to feel the shudder of death, the irreversible extinction, but also 
the possibility of impossibility.” (Fanon 2008, 193) 
Despite the age of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s influential work, Phenomenology of 
Spirit (originally published in 1807), the text is still viewed as having many relevant aspects that are 
still being reviewed, analyzed, and contested in contemporary contexts. One particularly 
illuminating passage comes out of the description of the form of consciousness that Hegel calls “Self-
Consciousness” (Hegel 1977, 104).1 In this passage, Hegel articulates the relationship between two 
self-consciousnesses2, each attempting to validate their own self and elevate their subjective certainty 
to objective truth (as cited in Sekyi-Otu 1996, 57).3  Each form of self-consciousness desires to be 
recognized by the other, for each self-consciousness exists “only in being acknowledged” (Hegel 
1977, 111). Hegel seeks to explain the process that aspires to bring about mutual recognition 
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between the two self-consciousnesses, an aim that is ultimately unsuccessful by the end of the 
dialectic, whereby the desired mutual recognition is not achieved.  
Throughout this section, Hegel makes clear that the process of attaining mutual recognition 
necessarily involves a violent struggle between the two self-consciousnesses, and a willingness of each 
to risk their lives in the struggle for recognition. He states in paragraph 187: “The presentation of 
itself as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing… that it is not attached to life” 
(Hegel 1977, 113). This being unattached to life is two-fold, viz., each self-consciousness “seeks the 
death of the other. But in doing so, the second kind of action, action on its own part, is also involved; 
for the former involves the staking of its own life” (Hegel 1977, 113, emphasis not in original). These 
aspects of the “life-and-death struggle” (Hegel 1977, 114) for recognition between competing self-
consciousnesses (the violent struggle, the willingness to stake one’s life for recognition) have been 
taken up by various theorists who analyze Hegel’s now widely cited articulation of the master-slave 
dialectic, and many have come to competing conclusions about the relative importance of each 
aspect to the overall dialectic. One important reading of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic has been 
advanced by philosopher and critical theorist Frantz Fanon (2008), who addresses the centrality of 
the violent struggle in the process of slaves obtaining recognition from their masters, both within the 
theoretical master-slave dialectic and in real world accounts of master-slave relations. However, not 
all scholars who examine the dialect attribute a similar degree of importance to the violent nature of 
the struggle, and others who have analyzed the passage have criticized Fanon’s account.  
One important criticism of Fanon’s analysis of the dialectic has been raised by Ato Sekyi-
Otu (1996) who rejects Fanon’s emphasis on the violent nature of the struggle for recognition. Sekyi-
Otu interprets the dialectic in such a way as to highlight the importance of reciprocity and mutuality 
in the recognition process, minimizing the emphasis on the role of violence in the struggle for 
recognition. In this paper, I will be defending Fanon’s analysis of the dialectic, lending support for 
his claim that when “recognition”4  is merely given to the slave by the master, without the slave 
independently demanding it, the hierarchical power dynamics are reinforced, such that the master 
exclusively is in a position to recognize the slave (or not). Following Fanon, I contend that when 
recognition is bestowed on the subordinate self-consciousness by the dominant self-consciousness, 
the hierarchy is maintained such that the dependence of the slave on the values and determinations 
of the master is reinforced. Recognition, then, remains in the master’s control, which deprives slaves 
of the mutuality of being recognized on their own terms. Without the slaves playing an active role in 
demanding their recognition from masters, recognition can never be truly mutual, and will always 
necessarily be one-sided in favor of the masters. Even if the type of mutual recognition that Hegel’s 
dialectic aspires to reach were met, Hegel’s account still leaves the slaves falling short of reaching full 
subjectivity. The master does not need to be recognized on their own terms, but this is crucial for 
the slave who realizes that the master is dependent on the slave and the products of the slave’s labor. 
Full recognition of the slave as an independent self-consciousness requires recognition of the 
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complex aspects of their violent struggle to the death for recognition, which are not necessary in 
recognizing the master. 
  
I. Fanon’s Account of the Dialectic: On the Violent Struggle to the Death for Recognition 
 In order to understand Sekyi-Otu’s criticisms of Fanon’s position on the violent struggle for 
recognition, it is first necessary to examine Fanon’s argument. Fanon’s account of the centrality of 
the violent nature of the struggle for recognition is given in his book Black Skin, White Masks 
(2008)5. In the section entitled “The Black Man and Hegel”, Fanon presents his understanding of 
Hegel’s theoretical master-slave relationship, arguing that historically, Hegel’s theoretical dialectic 
was inconsistent with the historical realities of how things actually played out between French slaves 
and their masters. Fanon suggests that the recognition of French slaves was achieved without 
conflict, viz., without this recognition being demanded by the slaves themselves. Rather, recognition 
was granted to slaves when masters decided to “raise the animal-machine man to the supreme rank 
of man” (Fanon 2008, 194). Fanon argues that this weak recognition, given to the slaves by the 
master rather than struggled for and demanded by the slaves themselves, is useless. To enforce his 
point, Fanon quotes Hegel himself, stating that, “Action from one side only would be useless... they 
recognize themselves by mutually recognizing each other” (Fanon 2008, 192)6. Fanon’s direct citation 
of Hegel’s Phenomenology helps to illustrate his point that this type of recognition, that which is 
granted to the slave by the master without a struggle on the part of the slave, will not lead to mutual 
recognition. Granting of recognition to the slave by the master simply reinforces the dominance of 
the master and does not allow for the slave to gain independence through the process of demanding 
to be recognized. As the passage from the Phenomenology articulates, these instances of one-sided 
recognition are useless if the goal is to obtain the mutuality Hegel’s dialectic sets out to achieve.   
 Fanon argues that a slave’s active struggle or demand for recognition from the master is 
necessary to gain true independence. He again quotes Hegel’s Phenomenology, which states, “It is 
solely by risking life that freedom is obtained.” (Hegel quoted in Fanon 2008, 192) Fanon interprets 
this to mean that independence of affirmation of self can only be achieved through conflict and at 
times, may even require armed violence. Fanon illustrates this by arguing that when French masters 
decided to recognize slaves as persons, the slaves did not have to struggle or fight for this recognition, 
and thus, according to Fanon, cannot be truly and meaningfully free or independent.7 Being given 
recognition and being declared free by their masters affords slaves the illusion of freedom, but 
genuine independence belongs exclusively to the master, who had the power to freely choose 
whether or not to recognize the slaves as free, independent selves. Fanon states, “The black man is a 
slave who was allowed to assume the master’s attitude. The white man is a master who allowed his 
slaves to eat at his table.” (Fanon 2008, 194) Note Fanon’s usage of the phrase “was allowed” in 
reference to the slave, whose actions have to be permitted by the master, implying that the slave is 
not genuinely free or independent. The master, however, is in a position to do the allowing; the 
master is able to grant permission to the slave to sit at his table (note that the ownership is also in the 
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hands of the master), and so it is by the will of the master only that the slave is able to assume an 
illusion of independence. Fanon’s brilliant selection of words illustrates his point that in the absence 
of conflict and violent struggle on the part of the slave, the illusory freedom granted the slave does 
not afford the slave a true independence; the slave is unable to gain independence from the master. 
The slave is not recognized as an independent equal in the eyes of the master (again, note Fanon’s 
intentional usage of “is allowed” and “allows”). Thus, the slave is not truly free at all, even upon the 
master’s declaration of their freedom, and the two self-consciousnesses fall short of mutually 
recognizing each other, the goal of the dialectic.8 
 Given that Fanon has illustrated the impossibility of genuine mutual recognition and true 
independence for the slaves when their “freedom” is merely bestowed upon them by their masters, 
Fanon goes on to emphasize the importance of slaves’ activity in obtaining their recognition from 
the masters, as opposed to merely being acted on. Slaves must come to know the cost of freedom 
(Fanon 2008, 195), and must be willing to risk their lives in pursuit of it. Furthermore, Fanon 
understands that this struggle for recognition of independence is often violent in nature because the 
colonizing practices that enslaved so many people were violent in nature. For Fanon, violence − and 
sometimes armed violence − is justified, and indeed often necessary, for the colonized to free 
themselves from their colonizers and to be recognized as independent selves. He also points out that 
colonizers use violence and oppression to gain recognition as masters from those they are colonizing. 
The struggle for recognition then, demands a violent response from the colonized to force the 
colonizers to recognize their true independence. He states, “we are told that none of this is given 
free” (Fanon 2008, 196). Genuine independence of self and freedom for slaves will never be given, it 
must be demanded and taken from the masters.   
 
II. Sekyi-Otu’s Objection: A Rejection of the Role of Violence in the Dialectic and a Turn 
Toward Mutuality 
 Given this understanding of Fanon’s interpretation of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, Ato 
Sekyi-Otu finds Fanon’s account overly pessimistic; Sekyi- Otu rejects Fanon’s claim that the 
“freedom” that is merely “given” to slaves by masters is not actual. As Sekyi-Otu points out, given 
their subordinate status, this is the most likely route of enslaved persons obtaining freedom and this 
method requires no conflict, struggle, or death. Why then does Fanon insist on slaves’ active role in 
obtaining their own freedom, endorsing means of violent conflict, if it is possible for slaves to obtain 
freedom (not necessarily genuine independence, but at least non-slavery) without it?  
 Ato Sekyi-Otu poses this question in regard to Fanon’s insistence on the violence within the 
struggle for freedom. In Fanon’s Dialectic of Experience (1996), Sekyi-Otu analyzes Fanon’s 
application of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic to colonial racial systems. Whereas Fanon emphasizes 
the violent aspects fundamental to the struggle for recognition, Sekyi-Otu argues that this is not 
actually the most essential part of the dialectic. Instead, Sekyi-Otu (1996) takes the essential part of 
the dialectical experience of master and slave to be reciprocity, or the recognition of the mutual 
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dependence on one another (Sekyi-Otu 1996, 56). Sekyi-Otu argues that Fanon is recalling and 
focusing on the violent aspect of Hegel’s passage about the process of searching for mutual 
recognition at the expense of considerations for the importance of reciprocity. While Sekyi-Otu is 
willing to acknowledge that the violent aspect Fanon emphasizes can certainly be found in a reading 
of this section of the Phenomenology, he disagrees with Fanon’s insistence on its critical importance. 
He also points out that the “result of this violent confrontation, however, cannot be the death of 
one partner and the survival of the other. The death of one participant would eliminate the 
possibility of recognition by the other” (Sekyi-Otu 1996, 57). Mutual recognition requires both 
parties, so the struggle cannot actually be “to the death.” In this way, Sekyi-Otu believes that the 
violent conflict Fanon sees as essential to mutual recognition can indeed hinder mutual recognition, 
or even render it impossible.  
Sekyi-Otu argues that Fanon’s account of the master-slave dialectic underscores the primacy 
of the notion of reciprocity, or the idea that the slave and master are dependent upon each other as 
well as the idea that slaves obtain a sense of independence through their labor and their ability to see 
themselves in the things they create in the world. Sekyi-Otu takes these aspects of Hegel’s dialectic 
to be absent in Fanon’s analysis, leading him to read Fanon’s work as unnecessarily pessimistic, 
insofar as it does not allow the independence of the slave to be redeemed through their labor in the 
ways the dialectic in the Phenomenology suggests (Sekyi-Otu 1996, 58-9). Additionally, Sekyi-Otu 
considers Fanon’s claim that freedom is exclusively dependent on the proclamation of the master, 
leaving the slave entirely inactive in the process, is problematic insofar as it ignores the possibility of 
the slave gaining independence through recognizing him/herself in the objects of their labor. He 
argues that Fanon’s account is not really representative of Hegel’s theoretical bondsman from the 
dialectic, but is actually closer to Nietzche’s conception of the slave (Sekyi-Otu 1996, 60-61). Sekyi-
Otu points out that interpreters of Fanon have largely disagreed about whether or not Fanon’s 
application of the master-slave dialectic is an appropriate interpretation of Hegel or a total 
misreading of Hegel. Those who think Fanon has unfairly applied Hegel think so primarily because 
they hold that Fanon has largely disregarded the redemptive property of slave labor, and the 
possibility of independence through the objects of that labor. Sekyi-Otu points out that Fanon has 
written that the slave might even abandon the object of his labor, a suggestion that Sekyi-Otu calls 
an “aborted dialectic” − a move so far from Hegel’s intended meaning of the dialectical interaction 
that it is no longer interpreting the dialectic as Hegel presented it (Sekyi-Otu 1996, 60-61). 
Abandoning the object of labor, Sekyi-Otu argues, removes the ability for redemption of the 
“inessential” slave to a status of “immanent necessity” (Sekyi-Otu 1996, 60-61). He thinks Fanon’s 
interpretation could not be further from the “story of liberation which Hegel’s dialectic enables the 
Phenomenology to tell” (Sekyi-Otu 1996, 60-61). Instead, Sekyi-Otu thinks Fanon is telling a story 
closer to that of the conflictual portrait of human interaction painted by Jean-Paul Sartre in Being 
and Nothingness. If his reading of Fanon is indeed correct, then it would seem as if Hegel’s dialectic 
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is unable to accurately portray the historical reality of slaves and masters in the colonial context 
(Sekyi-Otu 1996, 60-61). 
 Sekyi-Otu is highlighting an important ideal by trying to recapture the significance of the 
notion of reciprocity in the dialectic; this ideal is relationships of mutuality and reciprocity among 
individuals regarded as equals, though of course, this is not where Hegel’s dialectic leads us. 
However, just as he accuses Fanon of ignoring the centrality of reciprocity, Sekyi-Otu ignores the 
importance of the violent struggle to the death that is just as equally a part of the dialectic Hegel 
presents. It seems problematic to ignore either aspect of the dialectic when an accurate reading of the 
passage would surely require attention to both. Just as mutuality is the end goal of the dialectic, the 
violent struggle is an essential means of moving towards that end. For instance, Hegel presents the 
staking of one’s life as central: in the passage, self-consciousness had to risk going “beyond life toward 
an ideal that is the transformation of subjective certainty of my own worth into a universally valid 
objective truth” (Fanon 2008, 193). This is indeed a struggle to the death, and only a willingness to 
die is strong enough to confirm the desire to be recognized and affirmed. If the slave is never able to 
demand this recognition of the master, or never able to stake his life, he will never have a true sense 
of his own independence, and the master will not take him seriously as an independent 
consciousness. If the slave’s freedom does not come by the slave’s own demands but instead comes 
by the decision of the master, this reinforces the independence of the master, not the slave. The 
slave’s fate is once again in the hands of the master. For this reason, it is fair and justified for Fanon 
to argue that this is not true independence for the slave, which makes mutual recognition impossible. 
 
III. Defending the Appropriateness of Fanon’s Reading through Historical Considerations 
 In defending Fanon’s interpretation of Hegel, it is useful to consider the background 
conditions of Hegel’s writing of the Phenomenology, and how the context might suggest that Hegel 
did indeed intend to emphasize the role of resistance and at times even violent resistance, in his 
analysis of the master-slave dialectic. For example, there is historical evidence to support the idea that 
Hegel was fascinated by resistance efforts among slaves in their attempts to demand freedom and 
recognition. In fact, historical correspondence suggests that Hegel was fascinated in particular by 
the events of the Haitian Revolution, which he read about in German press. In an interesting article 
that documents Hegel’s likely interest in the events of the Haitian Revolution, Susan Buck-Morss 
(2000) attempts to situate the Phenomenology within its specific historical and philosophical context 
to better understand Hegel’s motivations and influences when composing the work. Throughout 
the article, she illuminates the stark disconnect between Western philosophers’ analysis of freedom 
and slavery and the practices that were taking place in that same historical moment. She explains that 
by the 18th century, Enlightenment thinkers used slavery, which she describes as the “systematic, 
highly sophisticated capitalist enslavement of non-Europeans as a labor force in the colonies” as the 
“root metaphor… connoting everything that was evil about power relations” (Buck-Morss 2000, 
821). They contrasted this with freedom, which was often articulated as the “highest and universal 
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political value” (Buck-Morss 2000, 821). But, as she points out, as these philosophical comparisons 
of slavery and freedom were gaining intellectual traction, the economic practice of slavery was also 
rapidly increasing. Buck-Morss (2000) argues that this discrepancy between abstract thought and 
actual practice was fueled by the acceptance of “the exploitation of millions of colonial slave 
laborers” as part of the given world “by the very thinkers who proclaimed freedom to be man’s 
natural state and inalienable right” (Buck-Morss 2000, 822). She goes on to give examples of how 
freedom for enslaved peoples, though represented as a theoretical ideal by these Western thinkers, 
did not become realized as a result of their “ideals of universal freedom” or “revolutionary ideas”, 
(Buck-Morss 2000, 833) but instead occurred as a result of the very manifestations of violent 
resistance that Fanon (2008) defends. She illustrates this in her examination of France and French 
colonies. She states:  
 
It took years of bloodshed before slavery-really existing slavery, not merely its metaphorical 
analogy−was abolished in the French colonies... Although abolition of  slavery was the only 
possible logical outcome of the ideal of universal freedom, it did not  come about through 
the revolutionary ideas or even the revolutionary actions of the French; it came about through the 
actions of the slaves themselves.  (Buck-Morss 2000, 833) 
  
She specifically references the struggle of the colony of Saint-Domingue, wherein 1791 over 
a half-million slaves “took the struggle for liberty into their own hands, not through petitions, but 
through violent, organized revolt” (Buck-Morss 2000, 833). She explains how in 1794, the armed 
black slaves of the colony forced the French Republic to abolish slavery on the island and other 
French colonies. The former slaves, now free, fought British forces from 1794 to 1800, which sought 
to reestablish slavery on the island. However, under the leadership of Toussaint-Louverture, the 
slaves were able to defeat the British military, ultimately bringing about suspension of the British 
slave trade in 1807. In 1801, Toussaint-Louverture wrote a constitution for the colony and in 1804 
the new military leader Jean-Jacques Dessalines finalized the declaration of independence of the 
island from France, thus “combining the end of slavery with the end of colonial status” (Buck-Morss 
2000, 835). The newly declared independent state was to be called Haiti. In an unprecedented act of 
revolt, enslaved persons, through violent resistance, were able to demand their recognition, freedom, 
and independence from their former masters.  
 The Haitian revolution as described above was widely covered in the German press, 
including in the journal Minerva, of which Hegel was a regular reader (Buck-Morss 2000, 842). 
Buck-Morss suggests that the coverage of the Haitian Revolution was the source of inspiration for 
Hegel’s account of the relationship between master and slave as presented in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit. The Haitian Revolution represented a clear instance of the violent, struggle to the death for 
freedom that Hegel articulates (and Fanon defends). She notes that the Phenomenology was written 
in 1805-1806, and was published in 1807, the year in which Britain passed the Abolition of the Slave 
Trade Act of 1807. Despite the evidence that Buck-Morss suggests clearly indicates that Hegel was 
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inspired by the current events of his time, she notes that other scholars and intellectuals locate the 
source of ideas for Hegel’s work elsewhere, such as in the writings of Plato and Aristotle (Buck-Morss 
2000, 843).9 Other scholars resist such connections to intellectual predecessors or historical events 
altogether, instead considering Hegel’s formulation of the dialectic to be an entirely abstract example 
that was theorized independent of, and disconnected from, real world situations and philosophical 
precursors (Buck-Morss 2000, 843). As Buck-Morss points out, it is hard to believe that Hegel was 
completely ignorant to the events of the Haitian Revolution and incredibly likely that Hegel was not 
only aware of the events in Haiti, but was intrigued by them, leading him to articulate the dialectic 
of slave and master in response to his contemporary context.  
 Whether or not Buck-Morss is correct in her claim that Hegel was aware of the events of the 
Haitian slave revolution and wrote the passage of the Phenomenology in response to them is up for 
debate, and will likely never be answered definitively one way or another. However, whatever Hegel’s 
true inspiration for the dialectic, we can certainly examine the events of the Haitian Revolution in 
light of the dialectic. Doing so, I contend, offers a clear historical representation of Fanon’s 
interpretation of the dialectic. In this actual historical instance of a dialectical encounter between 
masters and slaves, the white masters (and political leaders and intellectuals), despite claiming to 
value freedom and independence universally, were quite unlikely to ever grant that freedom and 
independence to their colonial slaves. This is likely a result of the political and economic advantages 
(for the masters) of arrangements of colonialism and enslavement, despite the theoretical 
inconsistency with their bourgeoning commitments to freedom and independence as political and 
philosophical ideals. In this historical instance, as demonstrated above, slaves had to take the struggle 
for freedom into their own hands, viz., they had to engage in a violent struggle to the death, in which 
they were able to stake their own lives for their freedom and for recognition of their independence. 
It is quite unlikely that the masters would have willingly and voluntarily given up the many 
advantages bestowed on them by arrangements of colonial enslavement. Thus, it is unlikely that a 
more reciprocal, egalitarian approach to recognition, such as the one advanced by Ato Sekyi-Otu 
would have ever brought freedom and independence to the slaves under the given circumstances. 
To gain their freedom, the slaves had to demand it − to engage in violent revolt − and claim 
recognition from their masters. Whether or not Hegel was inspired by the events of the Haitian 
Revolution, and I believe Susan Buck-Morrs (2000) prevents a compelling case that he was, the 
events of the Haitian Revolution provide support for Fanon’s reading of the dialectic, and what is 
most likely to be effective in bringing about recognition, freedom, and independence for enslaved 
peoples in real life contexts.  
 
IV. Applying Fanon’s Interpretation: An Examination of the Struggle for Recognition in 
Contemporary Contexts 
 Employing Fanon’s analysis of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic to more contemporary 
situations of dominance and subordination can help strengthen the case for the defense of Fanon’s 
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position. For instance, examining The Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s-1960s can provide a 
more recent example of individuals who are willing to stake their lives for their recognition, as well 
as the often-necessary violent nature of this struggle. This is true, I contend, of both violent and non-
violent approaches to The Civil Rights Movement. In non-violent protests and acts of civil 
disobedience, the individuals who are participating are still acting out a mode of resistance to the 
dominant group, and are still exhibiting a willingness to stake their lives for their cause, as made 
evident by the numerous individuals who were killed, beaten, hosed, and so on for their acts of 
resistance. John Ansbro (1988) recalls, for instance, the spirit of resistance in Martin Luther King 
Jr., a figure largely associated with non-violent modes of resistance to injustice. Ansbro details how 
a young King, faced with countless traumatic experiences of the brutality of segregation, became 
“fascinated with the notion of noncooperation with an evil system” (Ansbro 1988, para. 5). King, 
Ansbro writes, “appealed to his followers to be true to their consciences and not to cooperate with 
an evil system that refused to recognize their personal dignity” (Ansbro 1988, para. 5). In this quote, 
we can see King’s appeal to the importance of recognition for the oppressed black people that he was 
leading in protest. He also calls on his followers to take action, through noncooperation with the 
unjust system, in pursuit of their recognition. This is consistent with Fanon’s account of the dialectic 
that requires those in the slave position to take matters into their own hands and demand their 
recognition from their oppressors. Interestingly, Ansbro points out that King was inspired by the 
work of Hegel, citing King as calling Hegel his “favorite philosopher” during the Montgomery 
Boycott (Ansbro 1988, para. 11). He writes: 
King readily identified with Hegel’s insight that conflict is essential to progress and that each 
synthesis – that is that each achievement of a degree of freedom – can become a new point of 
departure for further struggles for total freedom. Hegel had indicated that seriousness, suffering, 
patience, and labor of the negative constitute the dialectical life of the spirit in search for freedom. 
King reaffirmed this principle by his contention that the passionate concern of dedicated individuals, 
as well as their sacrifices, struggles, and tireless exertions, are necessary for every step toward the goal 
of justice. (Ansbro 1988, para. 12-13) 
We can see in this connection between Hegel and the non-violent philosophy of resistance 
of Martin Luther King Jr. that activity in the struggle for resistance can take many forms, and not all 
of these forms are necessarily violent. However, consistent with Fanon’s reading of the dialectic, 
Martin Luther King Jr.’s leadership in the Civil Rights Movement, through various forms of non-
violent protests and civil disobedience, reflects the importance of oppressed persons demanding 
their recognition and independence, through a struggle that is often violent in nature (even if it is 
not intended to be), and for which participants are willing to risk their lives in pursuit of that 
recognition.  
Of course, Martin Luther King was not the only important leader of the Civil Rights 
Movement, and non-violent civil disobedience was not the only philosophy of resistance employed 
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during that time.  More actively aggressive, and at times violent, approaches to black liberation 
during the era of the Civil Rights Movement were also advanced, for instance the methods advocated 
by Malcolm X. Malcolm X recognized that violence, specifically in the form of self-defense, could 
be a legitimate response for black individuals to take when they found themselves in unsafe and 
unjust environments. He stated:  
 
We assert in those areas where government is either unable or unwilling to protect the lives and 
property of our people, that our people are within their rights to protect themselves by whatever 
means necessary. A man with a rifle or club can only be stopped by a person with a rifle or club. 
(Malcom X as cited in Breitman 1967, 106-7) 
 
I take the violence that Malcolm X is promoting in this quote to be justified − not 
unnecessary or unwarranted. This quote, and the general philosophy advanced by Malcolm X, 
acknowledges that violence can, at times, be justified in response to violent systems, especially when 
that violence represents a form of self-defense or a step in the direction of liberation. When social 
and political systems are structured such that black lives are not being valued and/or protected by 
that system, this very well may necessitate that black persons take matters into their own hands to 
protect themselves and/or to demand recognition from that system on their own terms. If the 
systems that black people found themselves in were more just, and offered equal amounts of 
necessary protections and resources to black persons as it provides to white persons, (viz., if black 
persons were afforded equal recognition by various social systems as white persons), violent forms 
of resistance would never be justified (or for that matter, necessary). However, there are many 
reasons to believe that we are not in such a system at all, but rather we are in a social system that 
disproportionately advantages white people while systematically disadvantaging people of color. 
When society is structured such that white people (masters, if you will), are able to get away with 
perpetrating violence against black individuals without consequence, then black persons 
(representative of a slave class), are put in a position to have to defend themselves and to fight for 
their equal recognition. Often, responses by those in the oppressed position (black people in 
American society) will be violent, because the oppression that keeps them in the subjugated position 
is violent. On this, Malcolm X stated:  
 
Tactics based solely on morality can only succeed when you are dealing with basically moral people 
or a moral system. A man or system which opposes a man because of his color is not moral. It is the 
duty of every African-American community throughout this country to protect its people against 
mass murderers, bombers, lynchers, floggers, brutalizers, and exploiters. (Malcom X as cited in 
Breitman 1967, 106-7) 
  
Malcolm X’s ideas of black self-defense in response to corrupt systems and immoral societies 
that fail to recognize black individuals can help shed light on more recent activist movements, such 
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as the current Black Lives Matter Movement. The Black Lives Matter Movement is a racial justice 
organization and movement that arose in 2013 in the wake of the acquittal of George Zimmerman 
after he shot and killed a black teen, Trayvon Martin.10 The movement has gained further attention 
and support in response to various additional murders of young, unarmed black men, whose white 
shooters, often law enforcement officers were either not indicted or not found guilty upon being 
indicted. The movement gained attention for its demonstrations and protests responding to several 
deaths of unarmed black folks following the 2013 murder of Trayvon Martin, including the deaths 
of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Sandra Bland, Samuel DuBose, Freddie Gray, and several 
unforgotten others.11 
 Despite the widespread criticisms that have been leveled against the Black Lives Matter 
Movement, there is a wide array of evidence to support their claims of injustice in the so-called 
criminal “justice” system, particularly directed against people of color. Furthermore, despite only 
recently getting substantial attention, the issues being challenged by the Black Lives Matter 
movement (primarily mass incarceration and police brutality against people of color) are not new 
problems. In a 1976 article, John Goldkamp compares the rates of minority deaths by capital 
punishment to the rates of deaths in the process of apprehending suspected minority criminals. He 
argues that although evidence of racial disproportion in capital punishment has been widely 
discussed, even suspended in 1972 by the Supreme Court, that equal consideration has not been 
given to the decades’ worth of studies that have shown that racial minorities are disproportionately 
killed by deadly force, by individual officers in high-pressure situations (Goldkamp 1976, 169-183). 
The racial disparity in minorities being killed by deadly force evidenced in the work of John 
Goldkamp continues to be relevant, even in the year 2015. An article in The Washington Post 
chronicles various cases of the murders of unarmed black men in 2015; when the article was 
published in August, there had been 24 such cases. The article reports that black men accounted for 
40% of the victims of shootings of unarmed individuals, although they only constitute 6% of the U.S 
population (Somashekhar et al. 2015, para. 8). This means that unarmed black men are seven times 
more likely than their white counterparts to die by police gunfire while unarmed (Somashekhar et 
al. 2015, para. 8). Clearly, Black Lives Matter supporters have a point when they claim that unarmed 
black men are being killed at disproportionate rates, as reflected by the statistics. This 
disproportionate and unjust treatment of black people by the criminal justice system represents a 
failure of recognition of their independent self-consciousnesses, and the reality that the struggle for 
that recognition is as Fanon understands, often a violent struggle. 
 Not only are black individuals being killed at disproportionate rates through capital 
punishment and police shootings, but they are also incarcerated at disproportionate rates, making 
up an alarming portion of the imprisoned population in the United States.12 An October 2015 story 
in The Atlantic reports the following statistics:  
 
In absolute terms, America’s prison and jail population from 1970 until today has increased 
sevenfold, from some 300,000 people to 2.2 million. The United States now accounts for less than 5 
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percent of the world’s inhabitants − and about 25 percent of its incarcerated inhabitants. In 2000, 
one in 10 black males between the ages of 20 and 40 were incarcerated −10 times the rate of their 
white peers. In 2010, a third of all black male high-school dropouts between the ages of 20 and 39 
were imprisoned, compared with only 13 percent of their white peers (Coates 2015, para. 16). 
 
This boils down to the following alarming statistic: “One in four black men born since the 
late 1970s has spent time in prison” (Coates 2015, para. 23). Interestingly, as the rate of 
imprisonment is escalating, the rate of imprisonment for violent crimes is decreasing, and we are 
seeing more people, especially black people, being jailed for non-violent crimes.13 There is much 
more to be said about the unequal and unjust treatment of black persons by the criminal justice 
system in America. However, rather than criticizing activist groups who are displaying resistance 
towards these oppressive institutions, such as the Black Lives Matters Movement, we ought to 
consider the legitimate reasons for these resistance efforts. Further, given Fanon’s interpretation of 
Hegel’s master-slave dialectic in the Phenomenology, we can consider how these active forms of 
resistance are playing an important role in the continued struggle for black recognition.  
 A criticism that plagues Fanon’s analysis, as highlighted by Sekyi-Otu, one which might also 
be leveled against these applications to current forms of active resistance, is the lingering question of 
why these active struggles and modes of resistance would be favored over a more reciprocal, mutual 
process of recognition. Following Fanon, I argue against these criticisms, and I do so on two grounds. 
First, a non-violent bestowing of recognition onto an oppressed group, without the active struggle 
of that group, leaves the fate of the oppressed group in the hands of those in the dominant position. 
This means that the oppressors are still free to determine, when, if ever, those in the oppressed 
position are worthy of their recognition, whether or not they ought to be recognized and treated as 
free, and so on. The lives of the oppressed group remain entirely dependent on the determinations 
made by those in the controlling group, which reinforces the unjust and problematic power 
differential that allowed for that oppression in the first place. Second, even if we were able to justify 
(following Sekyi-Otu) that having recognition bestowed on the oppressed still represents genuine 
recognition, there are reasons to believe that the dominant group would never freely do so. Those in 
power might have a range of social, political, and economic reasons to maintain the status quo where 
their position allows them to benefit from it. If so, those in power might willfully choose to remain 
ignorant to the needs of the oppressed group. Nancy Tuana and Shannon Sullivan (2006) have 
articulated this motivated, active ignorance and the process of maintaining that ignorance within 
what they call the epistemologies of ignorance (p. 1). They describe these acts of not knowing, as 
more than a simple lack of knowledge or understanding, but rather as a complex, intentional process 
that is directly tied to oppression and exclusion. Dermot Feenan (2007) suggests that this type of 
ignorance is actively constituted and reproduced as an aspect of power (p. 510). Considering these 
theories of motivated, actively constituted ignorance of oppression by those in power, it is doubtful 
that recognition is likely to arise naturally and in the mutual, reciprocal sense that Sekyi-Otu suggests. 
Forcing those in power to acknowledge realities that they have chosen to remain ignorant to is likely 
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going to take the methods of resistance and actively struggling for recognition that Fanon advocates 
for in his interpretation of the dialectic. Without some pressure from the oppressed group, the 
dominant group is likely to remain comfortably and blissfully ignorant, while continuing to enjoy 
the benefits of occupying the dominant position. For these reasons, I defend an approach to 
recognition that appreciates the necessity of resistance, violent struggle, and the risking of life. 
Despite my support of Fanon’s analysis of the dialectic, as well as current resistance efforts 
that are seeking independence and recognition in contemporary contexts, it is important to briefly 
acknowledge the risks associated with even the most necessary forms of active resistance. In light of 
the explication of epistemologies of ignorance, there is reason to believe that powerful institutions 
have a stake in maintaining the power hierarchy, and as such, often respond negatively to the 
resistance efforts of marginalized groups. One potential risk for those who are engaging in resistance 
and struggle for recognition is the response of the criminal justice system. For instance, interactions 
between the Black Lives Matter Movement and law enforcement officers have not been particularly 
favorable, and this puts those activists at an increased risk of punitive measures from the criminal 
justice system. Additionally, when protests and resistance efforts do become violent, even when this 
violence can be reasonably justified, the risk of imprisonment or death at the hands of the criminal 
justice system increases.  
Immediate entry into the criminal justice system is not the only source of risk for those who 
resist their oppression, however. For example, when students from oppressed groups are resistant to 
unfair educational policies or unequal treatment in schools, they often face punishment for resistant 
or defiant behavior. This punishment often takes the form of removing students from the classroom, 
which decreases their opportunities for in class instruction, often causes them to fall behind 
academically, and may even have the consequence of starting their push down the school to prison 
pipeline (Tyler 2011, 291-295)14.  
Another potential risk faced by those who display resistant or defiant behavior has been 
outlined by Nancy Potter (2012) in her proposal of a virtue theoretical account of defiance. Potter 
argues that the “readiness to be defiant” is a virtue that may be a necessary character trait for 
oppressed persons to cultivate in order to live with self-respect under the rule of authority and to 
potentially challenge that authority and enact social change (Potter 2012, 24). However, despite her 
call for defiance among subjugated persons, she also warns us of potential repercussions of defiant 
behavior among oppressed persons, which can go as far as diagnosing healthy individuals who are 
exhibiting justified (given their circumstances) defiant behavior with a mental disorder (Potter 2012, 
24). While she does not want to deny the existence of genuinely pathological behavior that 
necessitates psychiatric intervention, Potter’s concern is that from the dominant position of the 
oppressors, normal, healthy, and even virtuous responses to one’s oppression might appear deviant 
or pathological. Potter writes: “As with other virtues, defiance has extremes and a mean. But 
identifying the extremes is difficult because actions that are appropriate from the perspective of the 
subjugated frequently are cast as an extreme (an excess) by those in authority” (Potter 2012, 32). She 
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develops her argument by way of an extended example of young black boys in the American school 
system, for whom bad behavior is often conflated with mad (or pathological) behavior. This can 
even lead some “defiant” children to be given a mental disorder label, namely that of Oppositional 
Defiant Disorder (ODD). Potter writes:  
 
Some children who are deemed “defiant” are eventually diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant 
Disorder (ODD), with behavior characterized as “persistent stubbornness, resistance to directions, 
and unwillingness to compromise, give in, or negotiate with adults or peers” (American Psychiatric 
Association 2000, 100). In other words, defiance sometimes is managed socially by medicalizing it 
(Potter 2012, 33).  
 
As Potter’s (2012) account shows, the institution of psychiatry, reflecting the interests of the 
dominant, oppressor class, might utilize the tools of psychiatry in attempt to subdue resistance 
efforts through the attachment of stigmatizing diagnoses to those who challenge the mainstream or 
the dominant social order. While Potter’s analysis suggests that this is currently taking place through 
the diagnosis of “defiant” young black boys in school settings, there is also reason to believe that 
psychiatric diagnoses have been used in similar ways in past efforts to restrict resistance efforts of 
oppressed persons. In his incredibly insightful book, The Protest Psychosis: How Schizophrenia 
Became a Black Disease (2009), Jonathan Metzl critically analyzes how Schizophrenia became a 
diagnosis primarily given to black men during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Metzl’s historical account and Potter’s analysis of current practices provide a compelling case of how 
psychiatry as an institution can be used to suppress the struggles for recognition of oppressed 
persons. Risk of hospitalization, being medicated, or social stigma can result from psychiatry’s 
pathologizing of resistance efforts among oppressed persons. When these risks are paired with the 
previously mentioned risks of incarceration, violence, or even death at the hands of the criminal 
justice system, it becomes evident that the violent struggle for recognition, even where necessary and 
justified, is not without risks. This is a dialectic, after all, and both sides are in struggle. The oppressor 
class has its own ways of resisting the struggles of the oppressed (criminalizing and pathologizing 
resistance efforts), and they employ those tools in an effort to maintain their position as dominant 
“masters”.  
 
V. By Way of Conclusion 
When reading Hegel’s classic master-slave dialectic, it is important to reflect on why Hegel 
chose to include the ideas of “violence” and the “struggle to the death”. While Sekyi-Otu claims that 
some other Hegelian notions are absent or underscored in Fanon’s interpretation of the dialectic, I 
argue that Fanon’s account is entirely justifiable reading of Hegel, and also provides a more accurate 
picture of historical and contemporary resistance efforts. As evidenced by the historical and 
contemporary contexts examined, without active struggle there will never be genuine recognition of 
the oppressed group. Without a willingness to risk life in the struggle, the oppressed and/or the 
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enslaved can never truly understand the cost of freedom or show that they value independence and 
truth of self even more than they value life itself. Further, when the master(s) begin to see that 
freedom is so valuable to the slaves, that they are willing to stake their own lives for it, the master can 
start to cultivate an appreciation of the slaves’ desire for independence and begin to move towards 
genuine recognition.  
When slaves are simply set free by their masters without being able to risk their own lives 
demanding their freedom, the slaves are prevented from the attainment of individual, independent 
self-consciousnesses. If this is the case, then actual historical slaves do not gain the independence that 
Hegel’s theoretical slave can obtain by seeing themselves in the objects of their creation. The 
historical slaves never gain the status of master, because when “there are no longer slaves, there are 
no longer masters” (Sekyi-Otu 1996, 219). Even if the slaves are freed from slavery, if they themselves 
did not play the essential role in obtaining this freedom, and it was instead granted out of the values 
and dominance of the master, then the master is still in control of the possibilities available to the 
slaves. Thus, their futures are still dictated by the freedom proclamation of their white master. And, 
given the aforementioned work in the area of epistemologies of ignorance (Tuana and Sullivan 
2006), there is reason to believe that the masters would never willingly give up their power and 
bestow freedom on those individuals who they benefit from keeping under their control.  
For these reasons, I maintain that Fanon’s account is able to withstand Sekyi-Otu’s criticisms 
and represents the strongest reading of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, as well as the most accurate 
representation of the dialectic as it manifests itself in real world applications. Fanon’s emphasis on 
the role of the violent struggle to the death for recognition can shed light on contemporary resistance 
efforts by various subjugated groups in their struggles for recognition by society. This resistance, 
which at times necessitates violence and the risking of lives, is arguably necessary for oppressed 
persons to obtain their recognition on their own terms. Having a societal recognition imposed upon 
them by the dominant members of society merely reinforces and reproduces unjust hierarchies of 
power and systems of domination and oppression. Only resistance efforts that involve the 
demanding of recognition on behalf of oppressed persons can upset these systems and begin to move 
us towards a society in which mutual recognition could possibly be achieved.  
Endnotes: 
1. Hegel (1977) states in paragraph 175 that “Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another
self-consciousness” (Hegel 1977, 110). He introduces the Lordship and Bondage metaphor, which has
come to be known in the literature as the “master-slave dialectic” beginning at paragraph 178. I will
be referring to the content of these passages as the master-slave dialectic throughout.
2. Hegel develops the two self-consciousnesses as lord (master) and bondsman (slave). He describes the
self-consciousness that is master as the consciousness that “exists for itself” (Hegel 1977, 115). The
slave, however, is in bondage and is necessarily tied to the master (Hegel 1977, 115). Each seeks
recognition as an independent self-consciousness from the other.
3. Frantz Fanon (2008) elaborates upon the importance of recognition by another for achieving
certainty of one’s self-consciousness. Fanon states: “Each consciousness of self is in quest of
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absoluteness. It wants to be recognized as a primal value without reference to life, as a transformation 
of subjective certainty (Gewissheit) into objective truth (Wahrheit)” (Fanon 2008, 192). 
4. By “recognition” here, I am referring to the recognition of the independence of the other self-
consciousness, here being the slave. The claim is that when masters choose to recognize their slaves, 
of their own will and not as a result of slaves demanding their recognition, the power of the masters 
(and not the slaves) is reinforced. The masters remain in a position of being able to choose whether 
or not to recognize the independent self-consciousness of the other − they are not being forced to do 
so. This leads to a merely illusory independence for the slave, but not an independence that is actual. 
5. Fanon’s Black Skins, White Masks was originally published in 1952, but was translated and 
published in English in 1967. The translation used here is translated by Richard Philcox in 2008, 
Grove Press New York, NY. Fanon examines Hegel’s dialectic in a subsection of the chapter “The 
Black Man and Recognition” found in this edition on pages 191-197. 
6. The quote Fanon is using from The Phenomenology can be found at paragraph 184 (Hegel 1977, 
112). 
7. It is important to note the relation between the terms recognition, freedom, and independence as 
used in Fanon’s analysis of the dialectic. When he is referring to the theoretical struggle for 
recognition, he is primarily focusing on how recognition is necessary for independence of self. When 
he transitions into his discussion of French slaves being “freed” by their masters, he begins talking 
about the notion of freedom (for example, “As master, the white man now told the black man: ‘You 
are now free’”) (Fanon 2008, 195). Fanon seems to be suggesting that recognition of another, as a 
truly independent self, is essential for that person’s being truly free. In these ways, genuine 
recognition and mutuality are preconditions for genuine freedom, on Fanon’s account. 
8. It is also important for Fanon that masters recognize slaves as they are, in their genuine difference. 
Fanon notes that masters often deny difference, in a shallow attempt at mutuality that again is 
illusory and falls short of genuine recognition. Fanon states: “The white man says to him: ‘Brother, 
there is no difference between us.’ But the black man knows there is a difference. He wants it” (Fanon 
2008, 196). I think this is important to note in light of the application I am making to the 
contemporary racial context in America. Given the push towards so-called “colorblind” ideologies 
that claim racial neutrality and reject racial difference, Fanon’s quote can remind us that genuine 
recognition requires coming to see people as independent selves in their many differences. When the 
masters deny that there are any differences between them and the slaves, they are masking differences 
that are important to the slaves and who they are. Genuine recognition requires seeing and 
appreciating differences, not masking them in pursuit of superficial neutrality. 
9. For an example of another scholar who locates Hegel’s inspiration for the passage in his intellectual 
predecessors, as opposed to his witnessing social and political events around him, see Remo Bodei 
(2007). Bodei argues that Hegel followed Aristotle in his articulation of the master-slave dialectic. 
10. Interestingly, Ciccariello-Maher (2012) has analyzed the conflict between Martin and Zimmerman, 
and ultimately Martin’s murder by Zimmerman, through the lens of Fanon’s interpretation of 
Hegel’s dialectic. This application of Fanon’s reformulated dialectic to gain insight into the murder 
of Trayvon Martin lends support to my claim that Fanon offers the most informative understanding 
of the dialectic, particularly for its use in contemporary applications.  
11.  For more information on the activist group and racial justice movement, Black Lives Matter, or to 
find out how to get involved, see their website at http://blacklivesmatter.com. 
12. For a more comprehensive analysis of the racialized system of mass incarceration in the United States, 
see Michelle Alexander’s 2010 book The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness. Alexander provides compelling and jarring statistics on the racial dimensions of mass 
incarceration in the United States, and particularly on its racial dimensions. She argues that mass 
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incarceration of black bodies in the United States is a new racial caste system, following the tradition 
of slavery and Jim Crow. 
13. Alexander (2010, see footnote 12) attributes this to the War on Drugs, calling the War on Drugs the
engine of mass incarceration of black individuals for non-violent crimes. 
14. See also Fowler (2011). Fowler describes how “zero tolerance policies” and the expansion of school-
based policing have transformed school misbehavior into criminal offenses (Fowler 2011, 15). 
Fowler also notes that “schools' discretionary decisions to suspend, expel, and/or criminalize student 
misbehavior contribute to student push out, dropout, and ultimately to what researchers call the 
"school-to-prison pipeline” (Fowler 2011, 16). These disciplinary actions that function to push 
students out of school and toward jails or prisons have drastic consequences, and disproportionately 
so for students of color (Fowler 2011, 17). For further discussion of how school disciplinary policies 
disproportionately impact impoverished children and children of color, leading to further adverse 
educational, health, and career outcomes, see chapter 9, “Education” in Tyler (2011). 
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